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Human Rights Without Foundations
Joseph Raz 1
This is a good time for human rights. Not that they are respected more than in
the past. The flagrant resort to kidnapping, arbitrary arrests, and torture by the US, and
the unprecedented restriction of individual freedom in the US, and in GB, cast doubt
about that. It is a good time for human rights in that claims about such rights are used
more widely in the conduct of world affairs than before. There are declarations of and
treaties about human rights, international courts and tribunals with jurisdiction over
various human right violations. They are invoked to justify wars (e.g. Haiti, Somalia, and
Yugoslavia). Observance of human rights is used as a condition of participation in
various international programs, the receipt of financial aid, and so on. A number of
impressive NGOs monitor respect for human rights. As John Tasioulas notes: ‘discourse
of human rights [has acquired] in recent times … the status of an ethical lingua franca’. 2
No doubt human rights rhetoric is rife with hollow hypocrisy; it is infected by
self-serving cynicism and by self-deception, but they do not totally negate the value of
the growing acceptance of human rights in the conduct of international relations. The
hypocrite and the self-deceived themselves pay homage to the standards they distort by
acknowledging through their very hypocritical and deceitful invocation that these are the
appropriate standards by which to judge their conduct. However, the success of the
practice of human rights, as I will refer to the range of activities I have mentioned, poses
a problem for ethical reflections about them. 3

1

I am grateful to Ori Herstein for researching background legal facts. The paper was presented at
the University of Connecticut 2005, as the Minerva Lecture, Tel Aviv 2006, and at the Philosophy
of International Law conference at Fribourg 2007. I am grateful to comments from many on those
occasions and in particular to J. Tasioulas, A. Buchanan, J. Griffin, J. Skorupsky, and S. Ratner.

2

John Tasioulas ‘The Moral Reality of Human Rights’ p.1

3

Though the inadequacy of the approach that I will criticise, while being exposed in bright light by
recent human rights practice, has deeper origins. It reflects a misguided understanding of the role
of rights in morality, and in the justification of political and legal institutions.
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1. The failure of the traditional doctrine
Human rights practice is not only becoming better established, it is also
spreading its wings. An ever growing number of rights are claimed to be human rights,
for example, the right to sexual pleasure; the right to sexual information based upon
scientific inquiry; the right to comprehensive sexual education. 4 It is declared that all
persons have the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment. Future
generations have rights to meet equitably their needs. All persons have the right to
protection and preservation of the air, soil, water, sea-ice, flora and fauna, and the
essential processes and areas necessary to maintain biological diversity and ecosystems. 5
Some academics argue that there is a human right to globalisation.6 Others – that there
are rights not to be exposed to excessively and unnecessarily heavy, degrading, dirty and
boring work; to identity with one's own work product, individually or collectively; to
social transparency; to co-existence with nature. 7 And of course there is a right against
poverty, and a right to be loved.
The ethical doctrine of human rights should articulate standards by which the
practice of human rights can be judged, standards which will indicate what human rights
we have. In doing so it will elucidate what is at issue, what is the significance of a right’s
being a human right. Some theories (I will say that they manifest the traditional
approach) offer a way of understanding their nature which is so remote from the
practice of human rights as to be irrelevant to it. They take ‘human rights’ to be those
important rights which are grounded in our humanity. The underlying thought is that the

4

‘Sexual Rights are Fundamental and Universal Human Rights Adopted in Hong Kong at the 14th
World Congress of Sexology, August 26, 1999’ see:
http://www.tc.umn.edu/~colem001/was/wdeclara.htm

5

Draft Declaration of Human Rights and the Environment http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/1994dec.htm

6

Michael D. Pendleton, ‘A New Human Right – The Right to Globalization’, Fordham International
Law Journal, 22 June 1999, p. 2052

7

Philip Alston, ‘Conjuring up new human rights: a proposal for quality control’, The American
Journal of International Law, July 1984, 78, pp. 607. He took many of the rights on his list from:
Galtung & Wirak, ‘On the Relationship between Human Rights and Human Needs‘, UNESCO Doc.
SS-78/CONF.630/4, at 48 (1978); also Galtung & Wirak, ‘Human Needs and Human Rights: A
Theoretical Approach’, 8 BULL. PEACE PROPOSALS 251 (1977)
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arguments which establish that a putative right-holder has a human right rely on no
contingent fact except laws of nature, the nature of humanity and that the right-holder is
a human being. 8 And they must also be important rights – why they must be important
is not clear. Neither being universal, that is rights that everyone has, nor being grounded
in our humanity, guarantees that they are important. However, philosophers tend to
take it for granted that human rights are important rights. 9
In recent times Gewirth was among the first to develop a traditionalist account:
… it is possible and indeed logically necessary to infer, from the fact that certain objects are the
proximate necessary conditions of human action that all rational agents logically must hold or
claim, at least implicitly, that they have rights to such objects. (46)

Gewirth argues that this ‘dialectically’ establishes that humans have a right, which is – by
definition – a human right, to the proximate necessary conditions of human action.
While his argument has long been recognised to be logically flawed, it is typical of the
traditional approach, which is roughly characterised by four, logically independent,
features:
First, it aims ‘to derive’ human rights from basic features of human beings which are both
valuable, and in some way essential to all which is valuable in human life.
Second, human rights are basic, perhaps the most basic and the most important, moral
rights.
Third, scant attention is paid to the difference between something being valuable, and
having a right to it.
Fourth, the rights tend to be individualistic in being rights to what each person can enjoy
on his or her own: such as freedom from coercive interference by others, rather than
to aspects of life which are essentially social, such as being a member of a cultural group.

8

‘We may assume, as true by definition, that human rights are rights that all persons have simply
insofar as they are human’ (A. Gewirth, HUMAN RIGHTS, U. of Chicago Press, 1982, 41). ‘The
underlying idea is that all human beings, simply because they are human beings, are entitled to be
treated according to certain minimum standards’ (Ch. Beitz ‘Human Rights’ ROUTLEDGE
ENCYLOPAEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY). One may allow that permanently comatose people do not
have human rights. But one abandons the idea that human rights derive from our humanity once
one says that babies or people with Down syndrome do not have (certain) human rights.

9

Cf., J. Nickel’s characterisation in ‘Human Rights’ STANFORD ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY.
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Traditional theories fail for several reasons. Exposing their flaws calls for detailed
examination of each of them. Here I will point to three problems. They misconceive the
relations between values and rights. They overreach, trying to derive rights which they
cannot derive. And they fail either to illuminate or to criticise the existing human rights
practice.
Gewirth, for example, thinks that since we all want and value having the
proximate conditions of agency we must claim a right to have them. He ignores the
possibility of believing that certain conditions are essential to our life, and even of
striving to secure such conditions, without either claiming or having a right to them.
Thus he misconceives the relation between value and rights. He also believes, e.g., that
there is a general (overridable) right to freedom because ‘freedom is a necessary
condition of human purposive action’ (15) – a claim which is evidently false if it means
that, for instance, slaves cannot act purposively. In fact there could never have been any
economic interest in having slaves but for the fact that slaves can act purposefully, and
thus be useful to their owners.
I will turn to the third failure, the failure to exert critical pressure on the
practice, later on. First let us look at a more interesting theory which broadly shares the
same faults. James Griffin asks: What is the most important feature shared by all
humans?
Human life is different from the life of other animals. We human beings have a conception of
ourselves and of our past and future. We reflect and assess. … And we value our status as
human beings especially highly, often more highly even than our happiness. This status centres
on our being agents — deliberating, assessing, choosing and acting to make what we see as a
good life for ourselves.
Human rights can then be seen as protections of our human standing or, as I shall put it, our
personhood. And one can break down the notion of personhood into clearer components by
breaking down the notion of agency. To be an agent, in the fullest sense of which we are
capable, one must (first) chose one’s own path through life — that is, not be dominated or
controlled by someone or something else (call it ‘autonomy’). And (second) one’s choice must be
real; one must have at least a certain minimum education and information. And having chosen,
one must then be able to act; that is, one must have at least the minimum provision of resources
and capabilities that it takes (call all of this ‘minimum provision’). And none of that is any good if
someone then blocks one; so (third) others must also not forcibly stop one from pursuing what
one sees as a worthwhile life (call this ‘liberty’). Because we attach such high value to our
individual personhood, we see its domain of exercise as privileged and protected.… (8-9)

4

Griffin too grounds all human rights in features which all human beings are supposed to
share, and on the necessary conditions for their expression.10 He too takes human
rights to be general moral rights, which may or may not call for recognition or
incorporation in the law.
Griffin avoids one difficulty which undermines Gewirth’s theory by relying not
only on the fact that people value their personhood, but on its being valuable. But he
too fails to show that that value establishes rights. His argument that personhood is not
merely valuable but a ground of rights is: ‘autonomy and liberty are of special value to
us, and thus attract the special protection of rights.’ (22) By that argument if the love of
my children is the most important thing to me then I have a right to it.
Griffin is aware of a simple objection: are not people whose human rights were
systematically denied, like slaves, nevertheless persons? His response is:
But that is not the picture of agency at the heart of my account …. My somewhat ampler
picture is of a self-decider (that is, someone autonomous) who, within limits, is not blocked from
pursuing his or her conception of a worthwhile life (that is, someone also at liberty) and
furthermore typically realizes some of it. All three ― choosing, pursuing, and realizing ― are
part of what we value in normative agency. If any is missing, one’s agency, on this ampler
interpretation, is deficient. (24)

But this response is fatal to the whole account. The problem is that (according
to him) (a) being a person endows one with human rights, and (b) these rights are to
one’s continued existence as a person (they are ‘protections of our … personhood’). If
personhood is understood as the capacity for intentional agency then human rights are
indeed enjoyed by almost every human being, but they protect just what is essential for
that capacity. They are rights against, for example, the administration of chemicals which
seriously impair our ability to think, form intentions or act. They are rights against
severe dehydration, sensory deprivation etc. But they do not include rights against
slavery, arbitrary arrest, and the like as these conditions do not affect our ability to act
intentionally. If, however, the rights are as ample as Griffin describes them, if
personhood is the capacity to

10

Griffin postulates that what he calls ‘personhood’ is just one of two grounds for human rights, the
other being practicability. For our purposes we can ignore this second ground.

5

choose one’s own path through life — that is, not be dominated or controlled by someone or
something else ... And … one’s choice must be real; one must have at least a certain minimum
education and information. And having chosen, one must then be able to act; that is, one must
have at least the minimum provision of resources and capabilities that it takes.

Then different problems arise. Take his first condition first: ‘one must choose one’s own
course through life – that is not be dominated or controlled by someone or something
else’: Is it really true that someone who is dominated by his powerful mother, or
controlled by his commitment to his employer (having signed a 10 year contract, on
condition that the employer first pays for his education) less of a person than someone
who is not so dominated or controlled? The circumstances I mentioned may or may not
be undesirable, the life of the people so controlled or dominated may be better or
worse as a result, but are those people really persons only to a lesser degree? I find it
difficult to avoid the suspicion that Griffin is smuggling a particular ideal of a good life
into his notion of being a person to the fullest degree.
Turn now to the third condition: ‘having chosen, one must then be able to act; that is,
one must have at least the minimum provision of resources and capabilities that it takes’
– act here seems to mean act with a good chance of success, of achieving one’s goals.
This exposes an additional problem with Griffin’s rich notion of personhood. Is it not so
rich as to include all the conditions of a good life which one person can secure for
another? Griffin thinks that there is no problem here:
that human rights are grounded in personhood imposes an obvious constraint on their content:
they are rights not to anything that promotes human good or flourishing, but merely to what is
needed for human status. 11

Finding a threshold to human rights is essential for the traditional approach. It takes
human rights to mark a normatively exceptional domain. They deserve protection even

11

Griffin provides ‘an argument’ for this conclusion:
… If we had rights to all that is needed for a good or happy life, then the language of rights would
become redundant. We already have a perfectly adequate way of speaking about individual well-being and
any obligations there might be to promote it. (8-9)
But, barring some argument that there cannot be alternative terminologies for talking about the
same subject matter, this seems unconvincing.
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if that requires exceptional measures. This task can only succeed if people do not have
human rights to everything which will or may improve the quality of their life. For if
people have such rights they are not exceptional, and they fail to play the role that
traditional accounts assign them.
If human rights are rights of those with the capacity for intentional agency to
preserve that capacity, the distinction between capacity and its exercise is relatively
clear, and a case for the privileged standing of the capacity can be made, at least so long
as it is not claimed that the privilege is absolute. But Griffin quite explicitly extends the
grounds of human rights beyond the capacity for intentional action. He includes
conditions making its successful exercise likely, conditions such as the availability of
education and information, of resources and opportunities. At every point he adds
‘minimal’ – minimal education and information etc. But if minimal means some
information, some resources and opportunities, however little, it is a standard easy to
meet, and almost impossible to violate. Just by being alive (and non-comatose) we have
some knowledge, resources and opportunities. Slaves have them. Griffin, of course, does
not mean his minimal standard to be that skimpy. He suggests a generous standard. But
then we lack criteria to determine what it should be. My fear is that this lacuna cannot
be filled. There is no principled ground for fixing on one standard rather than another.
The traditional approach offers a general theory of human rights as moral rights. There
are good reasons for setting various limits to the legal implementation of those or other
rights. They are mostly contingent reasons, relative to circumstances of time and place,
and to the machinery of implementation there and then feasible. What Griffin does not
provide are criteria for setting the minimal standards for human rights understood as
universal moral rights which enjoy that privileged status, and which go beyond the
minimum protection of bare personhood.
These observations expose the way Griffin over-reaches. He would have liked to
explain the existence of human rights as rights to protect one’s personhood. Such rights
may claim to be privileged, but they do not reach as far as he wants them to reach. It is
crucial to his claim that
Out of the notion of personhood we can generate most of the conventional list of human rights.

7

To ‘generate’ the conventional list he has to rely not on the protection of agency but on
securing conditions which make it likely that agents will have a good life. That leaves him
with no principled distinction between what human rights secure and what the
conditions for having a good life secure. 12

2. Alternative approaches
This leads me to a third worry about traditional accounts. The task of a theory
of human rights is (a) to establish the essential features which contemporary human
rights practice attributes to the rights it acknowledges to be human rights; and (b) to
identify the moral standards which qualify anything to be so acknowledged. I will say that
accounts which understand their task in that way manifest a political conception of
human rights.
Theories like those of Gewirth and Griffin derive their human rights from
concerns which do not relate to the practice of human rights, and they provide no
argument to establish why human rights practice should be governed by them. There is
nothing wrong in singling out the capacity for agency, or more broadly the capacities
which constitute personhood, as of special moral significance. They are of special
significance, and arguably they provide the foundation of some universal rights. Nor is
Griffin wrong in thinking that not only the capacity for personhood, but also the ways it
is or can be used, are ethically significant. The problem is the absence of a convincing
argument why human rights practice should conform to their theories. There is no

12

One addtonal point: Arguably, the capacity for intentional action is valuable for (and valued by) all
human beings. Though it should not be confused with the value, if any, of longevity. It is the value
of retaining the capacity for intentional action for as long as one is alive. It is valued by people who
do not wish to remain alive, or who would rather end their life than betray their friend, etc. Once,
however, we follow Griffin into the domain of ‘rich agency’ we can no longer rely on nothing more
than the value of bare personhood. We have to pass judgment on what makes life good and
meaningful, for that judgement is needed to establish the standard which must be satisfied for rich
personhood to be respected. This result is unwelcome to those who think of human rights as a
basic moral domain which can command the consent of people of various religious and ethical
persuasions, a domain which transcends most, if not all, ethical disputes about the good life.
Protecting the minimal capacity for intentional action may command such near universal consent,
though the moment we raise the question of what overrides the duty to protect that capacity, or
whether one has a right to it, the consensus evaporates. Regarding rich agency it does not exist at
all.
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point in criticising current human rights practice on the ground that it does not fit the
traditional human rights ethical doctrine. Why should it?
Rawls’s brief comments on human rights 13 constitute the best known, though
extremely sketchy, political account of human rights:
Human rights are a class of rights that play a special role in a reasonable Law of Peoples: they
restrict the justifying reasons for war and its conduct, and they specify limits to a regime’s internal
autonomy. (79)

Following Rawls I will take human rights to be rights which set limits to the sovereignty
of states, in that their actual or anticipated violation is a (defeasible) reason for taking
action against the violator in the international arena. 14 This is Rawls’s and my answer to
the first of the two questions an account of human rights faces: while human rights are
invoked in various contexts, and for a variety of purposes, the dominant trend in human
rights practice is to take the fact that a right is a human right as a defeasibly sufficient
ground for taking action against violators in the international arena, that is to take its
violation as a reason for such action.
Such measures set limits to state sovereignty for when states act within their
sovereignty they can, even when acting wrongly, rebuff interference, invoking their
sovereignty. Crudely speaking, they can say to outsiders: whether or not I (the state) am
guilty of wrongful action is none of your business. Sovereignty does not justify state
actions, but it protects states from external interference. Violation of human rights
disables this response, which is available to states regarding other misdeeds.
So far states have been the main agents in international law, and I will continue
to treat human rights as being rights against states. But I do not mean that human rights
are rights held only against states, or only in the international arena. Human rights can
be held against international organisations, and other international agents, and almost
always they will also be rights against individuals and other domestic institutions. The
13

THE LAW OF PEOPLES. For a powerful defense of Rawls’s position see Sam Freeman,
‘Distributive Justice and the Law of Peoples’

14

Unlike Rawls who took rights to be human rights only if their serious violation could justify armed
intervention, I take them to be rights whose violation can justify any international action against
violators: making conformity to rights a condition of aid, calling on states to report on their
conduct re protection of human rights, condemning violation, refusing to provide landing or overflight rights, trade boycotts, and others.
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claim is only that being rights whose violation is a reason for action against states in the
international arena is distinctive of human rights, according to human rights practice.
This being so, we have the core answer to the second question as well: human
rights are those regarding which sovereignty-limiting measures are morally justified.
International law is at fault when it recognises as a human right something which,
morally speaking, is not a right or not one whose violation might justify international
action against a state, as well as when it fails to recognise the legitimacy of sovereigntylimiting measures when the violation of rights morally justifies them.
Rawls’s own statement of the conditions which would establish a right as a
human right are, however, unsatisfactory. Human rights, Rawls tells us, are
Necessary conditions of any system of social cooperation. When they are regularly violated, we
have command by force, a slave system, and no cooperation of any kind. (68)

This he says ‘accounts’ for the features of human rights, which may imply that that is the
justification for holding the rights he lists as fulfilling the role he assigns to human rights.
In THE LAW OF PEOPLES Rawls’s explanation of social co-operation is very sketchy,
but it implicitly refers to his earlier explanation of an ideal of social co-operation holding
between ‘free and equal moral persons’ according to which ‘social co-operation [is] not
simply … a productive and socially coordinated activity, but … [one] fulfilling a notion of
fair terms of cooperation and of mutual advantage.’15 ‘Social cooperation’, he wrote
elsewhere, ‘is always for mutual benefit … [I]t involves … a shared notion of fair terms
of cooperation, which each participant may reasonably be expected to accept, provided
that everyone else likewise accepts them … all who cooperate must benefit or share in
common benefits.’ 16 From this he concludes that human rights include
The right to life (to the means of subsistence and security); to liberty (to freedom from slavery,
serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure
freedom of religion and thought); to property (personal property); and to formal equality as
expressed by the rules of natural justice (that is, that similar cases be treated similarly). (65)

Are human rights grounded in the conditions of social cooperation? The claim is
marred by highly doubtful contentions about the conditions of social cooperation. He

15

‘Kantian constructivism in moral theory’ (1980) reprinted in COLLECTED PAPERS, 325

16

POLITICAL LIBERALISM p. 300
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says that societies which do not meet these, morally very demanding, conditions
command by force. 17 This seems false. Furthermore, not all societies which fail to
respect the human rights which Rawls lists command by force. It is implausible to
suppose, for example, that communities which do not recognise personal private
property (one of his human rights) must command by force. Imagine a society where
everything which is not common property is owned by the clan or the larger family, in
the way that some small families organise their affairs. Why should they not enjoy social
co-operation? Similarly, there is no reason to think that all feudal societies, or all sexist
societies, which denied women property rights, and much else, commanded by force.
My main worry, however, lies elsewhere. It is about the way Rawls connects the
conditions of social cooperation with the limits of sovereignty, of the internal autonomy
of a political order. The moral limits of sovereignty depend not only on the conditions
within the society. They also depend on who is in a position to assert the limitations of
sovereignty, and how they are likely to act as a result. It is one thing, e.g., to set limits to
the sovereignty of states within a well-ordered and reasonably just organisation like the
European Union, and quite another to do so for the international arena say at the height
of old-style colonialism in the 19th century, and still different today, the heyday of new
style imperialism.
We must not confuse the limits of sovereignty with the limits of legitimate
authority. The sovereignty of states sets limits to the right of others to interfere with
their affairs. The notion of sovereignty is the counterpart of that of rightful international
intervention. The criteria determining the limits of legitimate authority depend on the
morality of the authority’s actions. 18 However, not every action exceeding a state’s
legitimate authority can be a reason for interference by other states, whatever the
circumstances, just as not every moral wrongdoing by an individual can justify
intervention by others to stop or punish it.

17

P. 68. So far as we know all political societies command by force in some sense. This fact is often
invoked as the mark of a political society. I assume that Rawls has in mind something closer to
‘command by force only’.

18

See on the conditions of legitimate authority my THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, chapters 2-4
(Oxford: OUP 1986).
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The point is controversial. One objection is that there are reasons to limit
intervention in the life of individuals (respect for their autonomy and independence)
which do not apply to states, since they do not have value in and of themselves. The
objection is then reinforced by a distinction between principled and contingent factors
which limit sovereignty. It claims that in principle actions exceeding the state’s authority
justify interference provided such interference is likely to succeed (in remedying the
offence or preventing it) and is not counter-productive, that is that its overall benefits
are not outweighed by its disadvantages.
While this counter-argument presents an appealing picture it is flawed both by a
simplistic understanding of the moral importance of state sovereignty and by
disregarding persisting features of the international situation. The moral importance of
state autonomy was fully appreciated by Rawls, and is the reason for his insistence that
his doctrine of the justice of the basic structure (of the state) cannot be simply extended
to the international arena. 19 As I see it, the core point, which is too complex to be
dwelt upon here, is that much of the content of the moral principles which govern social
relations and the structure of social organisation is determined by the contingent
practices of different societies. Hence the principles which should govern international
relations cannot just be a generalisation of the principles of justice which govern any
individual society. This does not establish a precise analogy between interference with
an individual and with a state, but it shows that respect for the independence and
autonomy of the state is of great moral significance.
Be that as it may. The main point I wish to emphasise is that the moral principles
determining the limits of sovereignty must reflect not only the limits of the authority of
the state, but also the relatively fixed limitations on the possibility of justified
interference by international organisations and by other states in the affairs of even an
offending state. When the international situation is one in which it is clear that
international measures will not be applied impartially, that they will be used to increase
the domination of a super-power over its rivals, or over its client states, etc. the moral

19

For his reasons see Scheffler, ‘On the Moral Division of Labour’ Aristotelian Society, supp. Vol.
2005, and Samuel Freeman
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principles setting limits to sovereignty will tend to be more protective of sovereignty
than in the relationship among states which exists within a union, like the European
Union, which has relatively impartial judicial institutions and fairly reliable enforcement
procedures.
Just as the moral limits of individual freedom vis a vis the state one lives in vary
depending on the character of the government and the public culture of the state, but
whatever they are they reflect not merely the principles of individual conduct but also
relatively independent constraints on the justifiability of interference by others, so in the
international arena the moral limits of state sovereignty vary with the relatively stable
features of the international situation, but at any given time they are determined not
merely by the moral limits to the authority of states but also by the possibility of morally
sound interference by others.
This consideration is ignored by Rawls. It exposes a lacuna in his argument.
Rawls’s conditions of social co-operation, whatever we think of them, are relevant to
the scope of state authority. They cannot determine the limits of sovereignty in the way
Rawls suggests. 20
This criticism of Rawls’s conception of human rights connects with a criticism I
made against some proponents of the traditional approach: their failure to examine
adequately the relations between value and rights. The same is true of Rawls. Quite
rightly he did not claim that human rights set the only moral limits on the sovereignty of
states, But nor did he explain what the other limits are and what distinguishes them
from human rights. Some of his human rights, for example the human right against
genocide, do not appear to be rights at all. To be sure committing genocide is wrong,
but is it the case that I have a right against the genocide of any people? Do I have a right
against the annihilation of other groups, e.g., of university professors? Not all wrongs
constitute violations of rights. Not all the limits of either state authority or state
sovereignty are set by rights. Rawls fails to examine the distinctions involved.

20

Rawls’s discussion of decent hierarchical societies, and of 'benevolent despotisms' can be taken to
indicate that he allows for the distinction between the limits of legitimate authority and the limits
of sovereignty. My criticism is that the argument for making the conditions of human cooperation
the basis of human rights is radically incomplete by not taking the distinction into account.
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On one central issue, however, Rawls’s observations are consistent with the
political conception of human rights: observation of human rights practice shows that
they are taken to be rights which, whatever else they are, set limits to the sovereignty
of states, and therefore arguments which determine what they are, are ones which,
among other things, establish such limits.

3.

Following the practice: the ordinary face of Human Rights
One immediate consequence of the political conception is that human rights

need not be universal or foundational. Individual rights are human rights if they disable a
certain argument against interference by outsiders in the affairs of a state. They disable,
or deny the legitimacy of the response: I, the state, may have acted wrongly, but you,
the outsider are not entitled to interfere. I am protected by my sovereignty. Disabling
the defence 'none of your business', is definitive of the political conception of human
rights. They are rights which are morally valid against states in the international arena,
and there is no reason to think that such rights must be universal.
Quite a few writers accept the downgrading of human rights to those individual
rights which are assertible in the international arena, denying them special stringency
and universality, though they are not always aware that these are the implications of
their writings, most often because they are unaware of the vacuity of the assertion that
human rights set ‘minimal standards’.
James Nickel, for example, thinks human rights are minimal standards for
governments, but neither he nor Griffin nor the others identify what is the test of the
standards being minimal other than that there are or could be higher standards on the
same matters. He is also one of those writers who make light of the universality of
human rights. According to him
some human rights cannot be universal in the strong sense of applying to all humans at all times,
because they assert that people are entitled to services tied to relatively recent social and political
institutions. Due process rights, for example, presuppose modern legal systems and the
institutional safeguards they can offer. Social and economic rights presuppose modern relations of
production and the institutions of the redistributive state 21
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Nickel is following Tasioulas who observes that according to some views human
rights must be possessed by
all human beings throughout history - but only at the apparent cost of excluding rights that
require or presuppose the existence of non-universal social practices and institutions, e.g. rights to
political participation or to a fair trial. By contrast, I have suggested that human rights enjoy a
temporally-constrained form of universality, so that the question concerning which human rights
exist can only be determined within some specified historical context. For us, today, human rights
are those possessed in virtue of being human and inhabiting a social world that is subject to the
conditions of modernity. This historical constraint permits very general facts about feasible
institutional design in the modern world, e.g. forms of legal regulation, political participation and
economic organization, to play a role in determining which human rights we recognize. 22

In this way accounts of human rights become almost indistinguishable from accounts of
international political morality in so far as they involve respecting some individual rights.
Charles Beitz, noting both the range of human rights, and the range of their uses,
observes that
Taken together, these rights are not best interpreted as ‘minimal conditions for any kind of life at
all’ 23 The rights of the Declaration [of Human Rights] and the covenants bear on nearly every
dimension of a society’s basic institutional structure, from protections against misuse of state
power to requirements for the political process, health and welfare policy, and levels of
compensation for work. In scope and detail, international human rights are not very much more
minimal than those proposed in many contemporary theories of social justice 24

Not surprisingly Beitz, who regards human rights as the standards of international
justice, also rejects their strict universality:
International human rights are not even prospectively timeless. They are standards appropriate to
the institutions of modern or modernising societies … 25

These authors do not always agree with one another, nor do they agree with my
view, namely that the politics of international human rights is drifting towards becoming
just the politics of international relations, in so far as they acknowledge individual rights.
While recognition of that drift is more common among those who embrace the
political conception, its traces can be found among more tradition-minded writers. An
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example of that is Amartya Sen’s recent foray into the field.26 Sen’s explanation is too
narrow in limiting human rights to rights to various freedoms, which leaves the right not
to be tortured (in mild ways which do not affect one’s freedom), and rights to privacy
which do not impede freedom, for example, beyond the range of human rights. But
apart from that his analysis is simply an analysis of factors which are relevant to the
morality of action. His human rights are moral rights, which may or may not call for legal
recognition, may or may not be defeated by any number of conflicting considerations,
and so on and so forth. He recognises the drift in human rights practice away from
taking them to have foundational standing or exceptional importance, while failing to
recognise the source of that drift in the adoption of a political conception of these
rights.

4.

Where do human rights come from?

A few clarifications: First, I am not dealing in this article with the merits or drawbacks of
the practice of human rights, or any aspects of it. My aim is to characterise in abstract
terms the moral standards by which the practice is to be judged.
Second, I do not deny that there may be universal human rights which people have in
virtue of their humanity alone. My criticism of that tradition is primarily that it fails to
establish why all and only such rights should be recognised as setting limits to
sovereignty, which is the predominant mark of human rights in human rights practice.
Third, just as rights generally while being reasons for taking some measures against their
violators do not normally give reason for all measures, so human rights set some limits
to sovereignty, but do not necessarily constitute reasons for all measures, however
severe, against violators. Similarly, they may sanction action in some forum, but not in
others.
Finally, rejecting the universality of human rights is no endorsement of moral relativism.
If whether someone has any of the human rights depends exclusively on contingent
non-evaluative facts then irrational moral relativism reigns. But that is not the view
here defended. Rather it is a version of the familiar and benign social relativism: there is
26
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a moral duty to drive on the left in one country and on the right in another. Which it is
depends on contingent non-evaluative facts: that everyone drives this way in one and the
other way in the other country, but not on them alone. It also depends on a universal
moral precept, namely that one should drive safely. But if the fact that there is a right to
jury trial in one country and not in another equally depends on some more general
moral right, say a right to fair trial, is not the traditional approach vindicated: All morally
sound human rights, it claims, are either universal rights or applications of such universal
rights to the conditions of this country or that.
This response is both right and wrong. It is right that vindicating any evaluative
proposition relies, among other facts, on universal evaluative truths. But it is wrong in
assuming that moral rights can be established only by reference to other moral rights.
Typically rights are established by arguments about the value of having them. Their
existence depends on there being interests whose existence warrants holding others
subject to duties to protect and promote them. 27 Thus the right that people who made
promises to us shall keep them depends on the desirability, that is the value, of being
able to create bonds of duty among people at will. That desirability – consisting in
improved ability to plan for the future, to form common projects, and to forge common
bonds – governs the scope of the right: only people for whom the ability is valuable have
the power to make promises (and that may exclude very young children, mentally
retarded people, etc.) and only matters regarding which it is desirable to be able to form
such bonds at will, can be the object of promises (and that may exclude commission of
immoral acts etc.).
So the political conception of human rights can and should accept universality of
morality. Its essence as a political conception is that it regards human rights as rights
which are to be given institutional recognition, rights which transcend private morality.
That explains why it is not common to find the right to the performance of promises as
a human right. It is pretty universal in application, as any human of mature mind has it.
Yet it is not one which should be given legal or other institutional recognition. Some
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promises, to be sure, merit such recognition, but not all of them, and therefore there is
no human right that promises made to one be kept.
Human rights are moral rights held by individuals. But individuals have them only
when the conditions are appropriate for governments to have the duties to protect the
interests which the right protect. A good example is the right to education. The right
lacks universality for it exists only where the social and political organisation of a
country makes it appropriate to hold the state to have a duty to provide education.
Hence while the right to education is an individual moral right the considerations which
establish it are complex and not all of them relate to the interest of the right holder.
The primary, though not the only, relevant interest of the right-holder is to be equipped
with whatever knowledge and skills are required for him to be able to have a rewarding
life in the conditions in which he is likely to find himself. Whether education, in a sense
which involves formal instruction, is needed to meet that individual interest is itself a
contingent matter. When it is required the question arises: what is the most appropriate
way of securing it for all? Under some conditions the state should be a guarantor that
education is provided, and when that is so people have a right to education, and when it
is so more or less throughout the world the last question arises: should states enjoy
immunity from external interference regarding their success or failure to respect the
right to education of people within their territory? If the conditions of the international
community are such that they should not enjoy such immunity then the right to
education is a moral right.
So that is where human rights come from. They derive from three layers of
argument: First, some individual interest often combined with showing how social
conditions require its satisfaction in certain ways (e.g. via various forms of instruction)
establishing an individual moral right. Some writers think that some rights are as they
may say rock-bottom, that is not deriving from any individual interest. Needless to say if
there are such rights they too will belong with this part of the argument. The second
layer shows that under some conditions states are to be held duty bound to respect or
promote the interest (or the rights) of individuals identified in the first part of the
argument. The final layer shows that they do not enjoy immunity from interference
regarding these matters. If all parts of the argument succeed then we have established
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that a human right exists. Each layer presupposes the previous one, but to establish the
conclusion of each layer requires considerations specific to it. So understood human
rights enjoy rational justification. They lack a foundation in not being grounded in a
fundamental moral concern but depending on the contingencies of the current system of
international relations.

5.

Conclusion
I have not offered an analysis of the concept of a human right. There is not

enough discipline underpinning the use of the term ‘human rights’ to make it a useful
analytical tool. The elucidation of its meaning does not illuminate significant ethical or
political issues. Focusing on the use of the term in legal and political practice and
advocacy, I claimed that it either relies on the legal recognition of human rights as
limiting state sovereignty, or claims that they should be so recognised. Given that, I
posed the question of which individual rights warrant such recognition, and what precise
limits to sovereignty they should be taken to set.
One result is that a right’s being a human right does not entail that it is either
basic or very important. To that degree this approach deflates the rhetoric of human
rights. But given the moral significance of rights which set moral limits to sovereignty
human rights are inevitably morally important. If they were not they would not warrant
interference in state sovereignty. Nevertheless, the political conception does point
towards a normalisation of the politics of human rights. That is an inevitable
consequence of the success of human rights practice. It is part of processes which saw
the development of regional organisations, like the EU, of functional organisations like
the WTO, and of a myriad of multinational regimes, like that regarding the utilisation of
deep sea resources, all of which eroded the scope of state sovereignty. It is due to the
ambitions of some states to achieve singular world domination, and of others to limit
that ambition. These developments enriched human rights practice, without necessarily
improving conformity with human rights.
We are in the midst of fast changes in the shape of international relations. As a
result human rights practice is in flux, and the indeterminate character of my
observations reflects this flux. That is inevitable, and being more precise and
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determinate than conditions allow is no virtue. Should we see further growth of statetranscending standards and institutions, including further international recognition and
enforcement of individual rights, the rights will lose much of the aura of exceptional
standing which is currently associated with ‘human rights’.
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